








There is confusion about what counts as abstraction in photography: art theorists class 
very different kinds of photographs as abstract, and common philosophical views of 
photography, if true, should cause us to doubt their very possibility. I address two 
questions here: “What is Abstraction?” and “What is Abstraction in Photography?” 
To the answer the second, I briefly consider a third: “What is Photography?” so that 
the resulting account is not undermined by a poor theory of photography.  
 In answer to my target question, I outline a schematic (and non-exhaustive) 
typology of kinds of work generically typed as “abstract,” in order to bring out some 
differences between them. I distinguish “proto,” “faux,” “constructed faux,” “weak,” 
“strong,” “constructed” and “concrete” abstraction, although the differences between 
them are not always clear-cut, and there is room for debate about borderline cases. 
My goal is not to resolve all such cases, but to show that: i) there is a range of broadly 
identifiable kinds of abstraction in photography; ii) that images can be abstract in a 
variety of ways and for a variety of reasons; iii) when an image is not abstract, despite 











I. The Problem  
There seems to be confusion about what counts as abstract photography: a cursory 
survey of the kinds of image classed as abstract photographs turns up a bewildering 
variety of cases, and it is not clear that all could be considered abstract according to a 
single definition. In philosophy the problem is compounded by the fact that there has 
been little work on abstraction by philosophers of depiction, and (almost) nothing on 
abstraction in photography. There is a literature on abstract photography among art 
theorists and critics, but it tends either to presuppose that since we already know what 
abstraction is, it is not necessary to define it—resulting in indiscriminate applications 
of the term—or to verge on the overly programmatic or prescriptive, with normative 
commitments being passed off as descriptive accounts.1 Given this lack of sustained 
attention to the term’s intension, it is hardly surprising that the examples given often 
betray confusion as to its extension, at times appearing overly permissive and at other 
times overly restrictive. 
 To make a start on rectifying this I try to answer two questions here: “What is 
Abstraction?” and “What is Abstraction in Photography?” In order to the address the 
second, I also have to say something about a third: “What is Photography?” This is 
necessary if the account of abstract photography given is not to be undermined in 
                                                     
1 See Lyle Rexer, The Edge of Vision: The Rise of Abstraction in Photography (New York: 
Aperture, 2013) and Gottfried Jäger, “Concrete Photography” in Jäger, Rolf H. Krauss, Beate 
Reese, Concrete Photography/Konkrete Fotografie (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2005), respectively.  
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advance by a poor general theory of photography—a live possibility when common 
assumptions about the nature of photography can still give rise (at least in philosophy) 
to the impression that there is something inherently problematic about the very idea of 
abstraction in photography, the documentary art par excellence. I argue that this stems 
from unreflectively internalizing a tendentious folk theory of photography—a theory 
that is benign so long as it is correctly perceived as local, but prejudicial as soon as it 
is mistaken for global.2  
 By way of an answer to my target question, “What is Abstraction in 
Photography?” I consider the most notable rival account, before outlining a schematic 
and non-exhaustive typology of various kinds of work generically typed as “abstract,” 
in order to bring out some basic distinctions between them. To this end I distinguish 
“proto,” “faux,” “constructed faux,” “weak,” “strong,” “constructed” and “concrete” 
abstraction, although the differences between them are not always clear-cut, and there 
is scope for debate about borderline cases. My goal is not to resolve all such cases 
here, but to show that i) there is a range of broadly identifiable kinds of abstraction in 
photography, and that these can be distinguished, at least in most instances, and ii) 
when an image is not in fact abstract, despite being widely regarded as such, why it is 
not. The resulting typology is descriptive: it is meant to draw attention to some ways 
in which images generically typed as abstract may differ, not to imply any normative 





                                                     
2 See AUTHOR REF 1 
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II. What is Abstraction? 
In art theory, “abstract” tends to be used as a contrast category to “figurative,” and 
means essentially non-depictive. A picture is abstract when one can no longer see any 
recognizably three-dimensional objects in it.3 Pictures that are abstract in this sense 
may still trigger a perception of depth (as when one shape or colour seems to float in 
front of, or recede behind, or be seen thorough, another) but cannot prompt us to see 
three-dimensional objects in their surfaces, on pain on collapsing back into depiction. 
Precisely when a picture is abstract in this sense need not always be clear-cut: some 
figure-ground relations seem to hover indeterminately between the two. 
Clement Greenberg was the leading theorist of this way of understanding 
abstraction in art theory. In Greenberg’s terms, an abstract picture permits “optical” 
depth but not “trompe-l’oeil” or “modeling in the round.” On his historical account, 
which I shall largely bracket here, abstraction in painting is the outcome of a process 
of gradual “silting up” of pictorial space from the latter third of the 19th Century 
onward. What Greenberg calls “optical” illusion survives this development; the 
depiction of objects in three-dimensional space does not.4 But note that it not the 
depiction of recognizable objects per se, so much as depiction of the kind of space 
that such objects inhabit, that precludes abstraction for Greenberg is. Recognition of 
                                                     
3 For the purposes of this paper, I assume an experiential, viewer-focused approach to 
abstraction—any picture is abstract that it is correctly experienced as such by a viewer—
rather than, say, an intentionalist, artist-centred theory of abstraction—any picture is abstract 
that the artist intends as such. 
4 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” The Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. 4, ed. John 
O’Brian (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), p. 90. 
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everyday three-dimensional objects is sufficient to cue perception of such space, and 
is as such incompatible with abstraction proper.5 
Major philosophers of depiction, by contrast, have had surprisingly little to say 
about abstraction, despite its centrality to the art in the 20th Century. Setting aside his 
psychoanalytically inspired interpretation of Willem de Kooning, Richard Wollheim 
includes a single page on the idea of abstraction in Painting as an Art. And Kendall 
Walton devotes just three pages to the extension of his account of imagined seeing to 
abstract pictures in Mimesis as Make Believe. Given the history of 20th Century art 
this is remarkable: yet, between them, Wollheim and Walton remain responsible for 
many of the current debates in the philosophy of depiction.  
On Wollheim’s mature theory, perception of pictures is “two fold:” it involves 
simultaneous awareness of a picture’s “configurational” and “recognitional” aspects.6 
When one appreciates a picture aesthetically one is simultaneously aware of its design 
properties—the colours, shapes, forms and marks arrayed across its surface—and 
what may be seen in the surface so configured.7 On Wollheim’s theory these are “two 
folds” of a single, dual-aspect experience, not simultaneous awareness of two distinct 
phenomena.8  
Given that nothing recognizable can be made out in the surface of an abstract 
picture, one might expect two-foldness to be ruled out in principle on this account, 
leaving one’s experience of the configurational aspects of the marked surface as the 
                                                     
5 Ibid., p. 87. 
6 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987) p. 21, p. 73.  
7 Ibid., p. 75. See also Wollheim, “Seeing as, Seeing-in and Pictorial Representation,” in Art 
and its Objects 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 212-214. 
8 Wollheim, Painting as an Art, pp. 46-7. 
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sole focus of appreciative attention. But this would be too quick: both figurative and 
abstract paintings are two-fold, and hence representational, for Wollheim. Not only do 
both have marked surfaces, but something can be seen in the marked surfaces of both. 
Where they differ is with respect to what can be seen in them. Wollheim distinguishes 
between them on the basis of the kind of concepts one would need to pick this out: in 
the former case, we might speak of seeing a dancer, street scene or vase of flowers 
(identifications that make use of “figurative” concepts); in the latter, of seeing an 
irregular solid, or overlapping rectangles in space (identifications that make use of 
“abstract” concepts). Appealing to the very distinction at issue in this way renders 
Wollheim’s own explanation more circular than informative, but it is not my goal to 
press this criticism here. Suffice to say here that  “abstract” and “figurative,” however 
these might be non-circularly redefined, is a distinction within representational art, not 
a distinction between representational and non-representational art. We remain aware 
of both the marked surface and what may be seen in that surface, in all but the limit 
cases of the uninflected monochrome and (notoriously) the trompe-l’oeil still life.9  
Walton concurs with this: because abstract painting continues to mandate 
“imagined seeing,” it continues to count as a representational art. Simply in virtue of 
prescribing imaginings about figure-ground relations, almost all non-figurative 
paintings continue to function as “props” in games of make-believe. Take the 
perception of one coloured shape as lying in front of, and thereby occluding, another 
solid shape in Malevich’s Suprematist Painting (1915), despite the fact that its surface 
is flat and made up of shapes notched into one another, rather than laying one in front 
                                                     
9 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 62.  
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of another in three dimensional space.10 Just as the distinction between figurative and 
abstract should not be mistaken for that between representational and non-
representational in Wollheim, so it should not be mistaken for that between 
supporting or not supporting imagined seeing in Walton. Rather, as it is a distinction 
between the kinds of entity that may be seen in the surfaces of different pictures for 
Wollheim, so it is a distinction between the kinds of entity we are mandated to 
imagine seeing when looking at different pictures for Walton. In the case of abstract 
pictures, we are prescribed to imagine various things about features of the paintings 
themselves, such as the spatial relations that obtain between the coloured rectangles in 
the Malevich. In the case of figurative pictures, we are prescribed to imagine various 
things about what those picture depict, hence about something other than picture, 
even if these imaginings are occasioned by looking at the picture itself. 
Wollheim and Walton discuss abstraction in passing; Michael Newall is the 
first philosopher of depiction in the analytic tradition to give it sustained attention. 
Newall characterizes the view that abstract pictures may facilitate an experience of 
seeing relations of depth, overlap and transparency that are not literally present (but 
not everyday objects) as “non-veridical seeing without recognition of volumetric 
form.” Perception of volumetric form, so construed, would mark the difference, in 
Wollheim’s terms, between “abstract” and “figurative” seeing-in.11 
So far so consistent with the accounts already surveyed. What distinguishes 
Newall’s approach is that it is grounded in the premises of vision science. Because 
                                                     
10 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make Believe; On the Foundations of the Representational 
Arts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 55-7. 
11 Michael Newall, “Abstraction,” in What is a Picture? Depiction, Realism and Abstraction 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 173.  
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human vision evolved for recognitional purposes—to detect objects, properties and 
kinds in our immediate environment—it is well equipped to detect features (such as 
edges, colour, texture) that subtend such recognition.12 Given this starting point, 
Newall’s account of abstraction must meet two conditions: i) it should allow that 
abstract images can depict properties and kinds, but not objects, on pain of collapsing 
back into depiction; and ii) only properties and kinds of a certain sort. The kinds 
comprising two dimensional shapes, lines and marks depicted in shallow space as 
parallel or near parallel to picture plane, and the properties being those that such kinds 
can take on when depicted in a two dimensional surface, such being seen, non-
veridically as overlapping, transparent, interpenetrating, and so on. So understood, 
abstract painting, despite frustrating the volumetric form recognition to which vision 
is attuned, continues to engage our recognitional abilities nonetheless: it occasions 
non-veridical seeing of a range of properties and kinds, but excludes recognition of 
volumetric form.13 
Terminological differences aside, Greenberg, Wollheim, Newall and Walton 
are committed to essentially the same conception of abstraction in painting. Abstract 
painting is two-fold in a distinctive sense; it permits limited perception of depth and 
spatial relations between forms, planes and lines—in Walton’s terms, it serves as a 
prop in a game of make believe spectators are mandated to play with the picture—but 
rules out perception of three-dimensional objects on pain of collapsing back into 
figuration. On the shared account of pictorial abstraction that emerges, a picture is 
abstract if and only if it is “two-fold” (Wollheim) in a distinctive sense: (i) it permits 
“non-veridical” (Newall) perception of depth and spatial relations between lines, 
                                                     
12 Ibid, p.177ff. 
13 Ibid, p.178. 
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forms and plains in a shallow space (or what Greenberg would call “optical illusion” 
and Walton “imagined seeing”); but (ii) rules out perception of three dimensional 
objects in space (or what Newall would call “volumetric form”) on pain of collapsing 
back into depiction.  
 
 
III. What is Photography? 
So much for pictorial abstraction in general; what about abstraction in photography? 
The only philosopher to have seriously engaged with this question to date is Lambert 
Wiesing, but I shall hold off considering his account until I have tabled my preferred 
theory of photography. Before we can ask about abstraction in photography, we must 
be explicit about our conception of the latter if we want to head off assumptions that 
can make the very idea of abstract photography seem problematic.  
Until recently, philosophical consensus conceived photography as an 
automatic image-rendering process, in which a mechanical apparatus (the camera) 
generates images that depend causally and counterfactually on what they depict. What 
I call “Orthodoxy” presents a powerful and intuitively appealing, if rather simplistic, 
explanation of photography’s oft-noted epistemic advantage over other, hand-made 
(“manugraphic”) forms of depiction: it is because photographic imaging mechanizes 
out the fallibility of human beings as recording agents that we accord its products the 
evidential weight that we do. But the theory has weaknesses as well as strengths, and 
the two are internally related: if bracketing the photographer’s subjectivity explains 
photography’s epistemic advantage, it also implies its aesthetic disadvantage. For it is 
not implausible to suppose that we look to art for just those traces of subjectivity, as 
revealed by what a given artist chooses to thematize or suppress, and how she goes 
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about doing so, that automatic image-rendering is meant to bracket. It is the particular 
artist’s vision of the world, and not the world simpliciter, that draws us to the work of 
individual artists. This holds for photography as much as it does for any other art. Yet 
this is precisely what automatic imaging is supposed to bypass.  
This trade off between epistemic and aesthetic capacity has motivated a new 
generation of philosophers to develop an alternative theory. What makes the new 
theory new is, above all, how it marks the difference between photographic and non-
photographic forms of imaging. This no longer turns on a contrast between machine 
and handmade images: rather than being differentiated by the mechanical nature of its 
apparatus, the automaticity of its process, or the natural counterfactual dependence of 
the resulting images on their sources, photographic imaging is henceforth identified 
by whether or not it implicates a “photographic event” in its causal history, that is, an 
event of recording information from a passing state of a light image formed in real 
time on a light sensitive surface. This can, but need not be, the camera’s film plane or 
censor: it might equally be a piece of photographic paper or film exposed directly to a 
light source. What matters, as the term “photography” implies, is the role of light in 
generating the image. 
This, one might think, is hardly news. In fact, the new theory is not so much 
new as reminder of what we already know. It can be traced back to Patrick Maynard’s 
characterisation of photography as a “branching family of technologies, with different 
uses, whose common stem is simply the physical marking of surfaces through the 
agency of light and other radiations.”14 This description is notable chiefly for the 
many things it does not say: there is no mention of automatic recording, mechanical 
                                                     
14 Patrick Maynard, The Engine of Visualization: Thinking through Photography (Ithica: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 3. 
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apparatus, machine-made images, belief-independence or natural counterfactual 
dependency—the backbone of all orthodox accounts. Rather than focusing on what is 
special about a photograph’s relation to what it is of, Maynard’s account directs our 
attention to what is distinctive about photography as a process for making images. 
This is significant because any account that begins by trying to isolate what is special 
about a photograph’s relation to its source builds in, without argument, a commitment 
to reference that the theory then has to make sense of. On Maynard’s account, by 
contrast, what is distinctive about photography is not some special relation between a 
photograph and what it is of, but the nature of the photographic process—specifically, 
the role of light in the production of the image. Because he does not assume from the 
outset that all photographs have referents, only some of the resulting images need be 
pictures, and only some of those pictures need be of anything. As a result, his account 
builds in no commitments to realism, resemblance or even reference—no requirement 
that a photograph have an object, something that it depicts or causally refers back to, 
in order to count as such. The relevance of such an account to thinking about abstract 
photography will be obvious. 
So much for the historical roots of new theory: the emergence of new theory 
proper can be traced to Dawn Wilson’s use of this approach to target the assumption, 
common to folk theory and orthodoxy alike, that photographs come into existence at 
the moment of exposure.15 This turns out to be false in both the analogue and digital 
case. In the analogue case, exposing the film to light creates a latent image, but the 
film needs to be processed before that image becomes visible and, if the film is 
negative or colour reversal, it also needs to be printed before it can be appreciated. In 
                                                     
15 Dawn M. Wilson (née Phillips), “Responding to Scruton’s Scepticism,” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 49:4 (2009), pp. 335-340. 
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the digital case, exposing the camera’s CCD sensor to light causes the capacitors that 
make up its surface to transmit electrical charges, but the charged or uncharged state 
of those capacitors not only has to be recorded, the resulting code has to be output 
through several stages of digital processing before it can generate a visible image. 
This process, though too quick to be humanly detected, nonetheless consists of stages 
that can be distinguished, both functionally and conceptually: output the same code 
through a different set of algorithms and it need not even generate an image file. 
Processed differently, it might be output as sound, and this shows there is a distinction 
to be drawn between the information stored and the algorithms required to output that 
information in visual form.  
In neither the analogue nor digital case, then, are photographs produced 
simply by exposing a light sensitive surface. More is required, precisely what more 
varying between theorists. These differences need not detain us here; it is what they 
have in common that is important.16 Whereas for orthodox theorists the recording of 
information from an image focused onto a light sensitive surface is sufficient, for new 
theorists it is merely necessary. And this means that any further stages of image 
processing without which there could be no visual image to appreciate must be part of 
photography proper. If there cannot be a visually appreciable image without such 
stages, they can hardly be dismissed as incidental. Such stages can, but need not, be 
automated; and in many cases, both historical and contemporary, they have not been. 
This includes everything from minor darkroom adjustments to compensate for poor 
contrast, exposure and the like through to elaborate combination printing in analogue 
photography and their digital equivalents. Such examples cannot be ruled out simply 
because they conflict with photography’s presumed mind-independence or natural 
                                                     
16 On these differences, see AUTHOR REF 1 and AUTHOR REF 2. 
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counterfactual dependence on its sources. For that would be to assume the truth of 
orthodox premises, when it is precisely the truth of such premises that is in question.17 
What differentiates photography from painting, on the new theory, is not 
mind-independence, automatism, mechanism, or natural counterfactual dependence, 
but the fact that some images are made using photographic technologies and others 
are not. So the real question is: what makes a technology photographic? What makes 
a process photographic is that it implicates a photographic event in its causal history. 
Because traditional darkroom techniques in analogue photography, such as dodging 
and burning, double-exposure and use of multiple enlargers all implicate such events, 
as do the manipulation of hue, contrast, saturation and gradient mapping in digital 
photography, all still count as photographic according to new theory—irrespective of 
whether they preserve belief-independence. On Dominic McIver Lopes’s formulation: 
[A]n item is a photograph if and only if it is an image that is a product of a 
photographic process, where a photographic process includes (1) a 
photographic event as well as (2) processes for the production of images.18 
Lopes’s definition consists of two independent clauses and it is their independence 
that is crucial: because the first secures the distinction with non-photographic images, 
the second no longer need discharge this burden. This frees up the processes used to 
create photographic images to be anything photographers want them to be—so long 
as they continue to implicate an event of photographic recording. Photography no 
                                                     
17 See Paloma Atencia-Linares, “Fiction, Nonfiction and Deceptive Pictorial Representation,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70:1 (Winter 2012), pp. 22-24. 
18 Dominic McIver Lopes, “Jetz sind wir alle Künstler,” in Julian Nida-Rümelin and Jakob 
Steinbrenner (eds.) Fotographie: zwischen Inszenierung und Dokumentation (Ostfinden: 
Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2012), p. 106ff. 
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longer need be belief-independent, nor requires a contrast class of belief-dependent, 
intentionally mediated images. From an orthodox perspective, this will seem far too 
permissive, and the obvious solution would be to build back in something like natural 
counterfactual dependency: 
[A]n item is a photograph if and only if it is an image that is a product of 
(1) a photographic event and (2) processes for the production of images 
that (3) ensure belief-independent feature-tracking. 
Less resolute, second-generation orthodox theorists, and perhaps also less permissive 
new theorists than Lopes himself, may want to quality this: 
[A]n item is a photograph if and only if it is an image that is a product of 
(1) a photographic event and (2) processes for the production of images 
that (3*) generally ensure belief-independent feature-tracking.19 
Lopes might even agree. But from his perspective, the question will be: what forces 
the concession? Whether (3) or (3*) obtain will depend on the social institutions that a 
given form of photography serves, not any general features of photography. Medical, 
scientific, diagnostic, forensic and legal practices are all “knowledge-oriented,” and 
this imposes additional constraints on the legitimate uses of photography within these 
domains: notably, that they not misrepresent the relevant facts and thereby encourage 
false beliefs about the domain in question. But such restrictions are not constitutive 
                                                     
19 By “less resolute” orthodox theorists I have in mind Catherine Abell and Robert Hopkins. 
By “less permissive” new theorists Paloma Atencia-Linares and (perhaps) Dawn Wilson. See 





features of photography per se. If they were they could not be broken, yet they often 
are. Orthodoxy conflates what is true of a highly visible, and socially very important, 
subset of photographic practices with what is true of photography per se. This is why 
it has difficulty accommodating photographic art in general, and abstract photography 
in particular. For new theory, by contrast, neither presents a problem: a photograph is 
a visual image, the causal history of which necessary implicates an event of recording 
information from a light image. Whatever further restrictions need be invoked to 
explain a given stretch of photography will be institutional in nature, not features of 




IV. What is Abstraction in Photography? 
Pause to consider what we have seen so far. “Abstraction” is not the absence of 
depiction, but a restricted form of the same, in which one has the experience of seeing 
spatial relations—notably relations of depth between planes, colours or lines—in a 
flat surface, but not volumetric forms or everyday objects. “Photography” is a wide 
array of practices, subtending diverse institutions, for creating, storing, and displaying 
“photographs,” where the latter are understood as images that necessarily implicate an 
event of recording information from a light image in their causal history, but require 
further imaging processes—which may, but need not, be photographic—to make that 
information available in a form that can be visually appreciated. Given a sufficiently 
determinate notion of abstraction, and a sufficiently broad conception of photography, 
such as these, there is no problem in principle with the idea of abstract photography.  
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Lambert Wiesing concurs in “What Could ‘Abstract Photography’ Be?,” the 
most serious engagement with abstract photography by a philosopher to date. Wiesing 
distinguishes the empirical question of what abstract photography is and has been, 
from the conceptual question of what the idea of abstract photography permits, noting 
that since what is actual need not exhaust what is possible, one cannot get to the latter 
simply by enumerating the former. This is why surveying the field of abstract 
photography, as is done in exhibition catalogues and the like, cannot yield a 
philosophically satisfying answer. For this reason Wiesing focuses solely on what he 
takes to be the properly philosophical, conceptual question. But it bears noting that 
both approaches to the question—the empirical and the philosophical—presuppose 
some conception of both abstraction and photography, the former to so much as to 
identify the entities that fall within the domain to be surveyed, the latter to say what 
the concept at stake, construed in such and such a way, permits in principle.  
In terms of the alternatives presented here, it is not clear where Wiesing 
stands: some of what he says suggests new theory, some orthodoxy, and some is 
ambiguous between the two. On what he calls a “wide” definition of photography, for 
example, “photographically produced products are always traces that can be explained 
physically and chemically. Photographs are what they are on the basis of relations of 
cause and effect: they are the permanently visible result of manipulated radiation.”20 
This is wide by comparison to a narrower definition of photography as the “technical 
production of figurative images [that resemble their sources] by means of optical 
                                                     
20 Lambert Wiesing, “What Could ‘Abstract Photography’ Be? in Wiesing, Artificial 
Presence: Philosophical Studies in Image Theory, trans. Nils F. Schott (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), p. 62.  
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transformation and conservation of traces of light.”21 While the narrow definition 
clearly implicates orthodoxy, a resolute new theorist will likely find Wiesing’s wide 
definition still too narrow. For photography cannot be exhaustively explained in non-
agential physical and chemical terms alone: this is what orthodoxy maintains, and it 
does not yet build in enough to account for an image that can be visually appreciated. 
Reference to “manipulated radiation” might build in what is required, but it depends 
on what “manipulation” permits, and Wiesing declines to say.  
  Wiesing has much less to say about the idea of abstraction itself, beyond 
distinguishing a wide philosophical notion of abstraction, understood as the absence 
of implication for other concepts, from a narrow art theoretical notion, construed as a 
lack of figuration: “a picture is abstract, in this [latter] sense, when no visible object 
can be discerned in it.”22 This is consistent, so far as it goes, with what I have said 
here; but unpacking what might mean for a photograph, given its means of generation, 
to preclude perception of “visible objects” turns out to be harder than one might think. 
The taxonomy that follows shows that difficulties arise for the more obvious answers. 
Wiesing himself defers to the champion and practitioner of “Concrete Photography” 
Gottfried Jäger on such questions, by presenting photographic abstraction, in broadly 
modernist terms, as a reduction to essence.23 Thus, in terms of process, “abstraction” 
can mean abstracting from camera and lens in favour of “preserv[ing] as visible traces 
the action of light on substances sensitive to light.”24 Further abstraction may involve 
reducing out the negative in Photograms, the object that occludes the flow of light in 
Luminograms, right through to the borderline case of seeming (but only seeming) to 
                                                     
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p. 63 
23 Ibid., pp. 71-9. 
24 Ibid., p. 64. 
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dispense with light itself—in favour of directly manipulating chemicals on a sensitive 
surface. In fact, as Wiesing points out, fixing light remains central to Chemigrams and, 
if it did not, they would not count as photographs. This is a point on which Wiesing, 
Jäger and new theorists from Maynard on can agree.  
But his broader theory remains too dependent on Jäger’s practice and self-
understanding to capture much that is in the domain. To show this, I now turn to the 
breadth of photographic abstraction, which comes in a wide variety of shades and 
strengths. Even philosophers would do well to pay attention to empirical matters—if 
they want their definitions to be adequate to the domains under discussion. Faced with 
such diversity, Wiesing could deny that much of it is abstraction, thereby vitiating one 
constraint on empirically informed and critically sensitive philosophizing, or broaden 




What I call “proto-abstraction” can, as the name implies, be considered a way stage 
on the road to abstraction proper. It typically depicts recognizable objects, but framed 
or lit in such a way as to draw attention, when photographed, to the resulting image’s 
design properties. This is achieved by a combination of bold and simplified gestalts, 
unusual points of view, strong lighting, close ups and other crops that direct attention 
to visual patterning in the image. Given, however, that this still involves recognition 
of everyday objects, it clearly cannot count as abstract on the forgoing account. It is 
formalist, rather than abstract proper. 
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Proto-abstraction was common among photographers attracted to abstraction 
in the other arts, but unable or unwilling to forgo the depiction of recognizable objects 
altogether for the sake of full blown photographic abstraction. Examples include Paul 
Strand’s Abstraction, Twin Lakes Connecticut (1916) and some of his early cityscapes, 
and Edward Weston’s 1936 series of Sand Dunes Oceano, all of which depend on an 
interplay of framing and strong, natural light. Other examples depend on dramatically 
“tipped up,” points of view (Strand’s View from the Viaduct, New York [1916], László 
Moholy Nagy’s Berlin Radio Tower [1928] or André Kertész’s images of Washington 
Square in the snow [1954]).  
The fact that photography proved slower than many other arts to embrace 
abstraction in its full-blown form may not be surprising, given how widespread the 
idea that photography is at bottom an art of documenting the world was and still is. 
Strand himself celebrated photography’s supposed “absolute, unqualified objectivity,” 
despite the fact that both his own work, and the terms in which he celebrated that of 
others, shows how misleading a characterisation this is for the kind of distinctive 
personal vision he had in mind.25 Meanwhile leading theorists of modernism, both 
within and without photography, took an orthodox conception of photography more 
or less for granted—despite modernism’s inbuilt telos towards abstraction.26  
                                                     
25 Paul Strand, “Photography,” in Alan Trachtenberg (ed.) Classic Essays on Photography 
(New Haven, CT: Leete’s Island Books, 1980), pp. 141-142. For a discussion, see AUTHOR 
REF 1. 
26 Clement Greenberg, “The Camera’s Glass Eye: Review of an Exhibition by Edward 
Weston” in The Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. 2., ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986); Siegfried Kracauer “Photography,” in Theory of Film: 
The Redemption of Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), and John Szarkowski, 





2. Faux-abstraction  
Faux-abstraction is a close cousin of proto-abstraction and the two can be hard to 
distinguish in some cases. It consists chiefly of various strategies of estrangement and 
defamiliarization that isolate objects from their everyday environments, or frame them 
in such a way as to delay or frustrate recognition of what one is looking at. What is 
especially interesting about faux-abstraction in this context is that it depends, for its 
dramatic effect, on leveraging the orthodox assumptions of viewers. Photographs in 
this vein occasion such delight largely because it is widely assumed that photographs 
necessarily show us how some corner of the world looked at some moment of time. 
Set aside whether such assumptions are true; were they not in play, these works could 
not carry the charge that they do.  
Jaromir Funke’s Abstract Fotos (1927-9) of complicated shadow patterns are 
one obvious example, Minor White’s land and seascapes employing points of view 
(such as Bullet Holes (Middle Canyon, Capitol Reef, Utah [1961] and Stony Brook 
State Park, New York [1960]) that make it hard to be sure what one is looking at—
though it is clear that one is looking at something—another. It is hard to overstate 
how widespread faux-abstract and related tendencies are in photography. The act of 
cutting away the rest of the world with the image edge, fundamental to much (if not 
all) photography, often works to estrange and abstract simultaneously.  
This overlap between proto and faux-abstraction explains why it is not always 
clear how to characterise certain images. Take Moholy-Nagy’s Radio Tower Berlin: is 
this proto-abstract in virtue of formal design, faux-abstract in virtue of strange point 
of view—or both? If the latter, it falls in the space where two overlap. Note, however, 
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that such overlap is not complete. One can estrange by photographing something at an 
angle or speed, or from a distance, that frustrates recognition of what one is looking at, 
without this entailing that the result appears abstract. Conversely, one can abstract, by 
foregrounding a composition’s formal design properties, without thereby estranging. 
So the two remain in principle distinct, even if some images do both.  
 
3. Constructed Faux Abstraction 
Constructed faux abstraction is, as the name suggests, a variant of faux abstraction. 
Unlike faux abstraction, which works by alienating or estranging a scene that would 
otherwise be easily recognizable, constructed faux-abstraction comprises works in 
which the photographer constructs a scene that can be photographed so as to give rise 
to an image that seems (but only seems) to be abstract. There are numerous examples 
in recent photographic art. Barbara Kasten’s Studio Constructs (2007-11) depicting 
arrangements of glass panes, lit and framed in such a way as to make their complex 
play of reflections and shadows difficult to resolve, is one obvious example. Richard 
Caldicott’s seemingly abstract images made by photographing coloured light filtered 
through semi-transparent Tupperware boxes (such as Untitled #179 [2000]) another.  
James Welling’s work from the late 1970s and early 1980s provides a rich 
seam of examples: here some simple, everyday material such as aluminum foil, filo-
pastry, gelatin or tiles is photographed in such a way as to make it hard to make out 
what one is seeing. Though colloquially known as Foils, Filo, Gelatin, Tiles (etc.), the 
works are officially Untitled, so as not to give the game away. Like faux abstraction, 
that one is seeing something is typically clear, as is the fact that it exhibits volumetric 
form, even if precisely what one is seeing remains much less so. Welling’s images of 
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sheets or fragments of filo-pastry, for example, could be mistaken for paper, crisp 
linen sheets or shards of ice; the Foils might be harshly lit lunar surfaces, ravines or 
dense foliage, and so on. Like faux abstraction, such images work to delay or frustrate 
recognition of what one is seeing, but do so by virtue of the photographer constructing 
the scene before the camera for that very purpose. But because they still involve the 
experience of perceiving objects and scenes, even if we cannot always say what, they 
cannot count as abstract stricto sensu.  
 
4. Weak Abstraction 
Weak abstraction, by contrast, records the world in such a way as to no longer give 
rise to a clear experience of seeing figurative content or volumentric form. Weakly 
abstract photographs home in on some corner of the world, an alignment of edges or 
surfaces that can, when isolated by the viewfinder of a camera, be photographed in 
such a way as to generate an abstract or quasi-abstract composition. We may not be 
sure that we are seeing some corner of the world, or be able to make out what it is if 
we do, though we always are. The art consists in the photographer’s ability to find, 
isolate and record the alignment in question. Like faux-abstraction, weak abstraction 
is pervasive; once again, photography’s ability to isolate and excerpt a fragment from 
a wider field of view seems to invite it. Like proto-abstraction, purists will see weak-
abstraction as a stop on the road to abstraction proper, albeit one considerably closer 
to the terminus. 
 Examples include Aaron Siskind’s well known images of walls of peeling 
paint, ripped fly posters, and crumbling plaster surfaces (such as Chicago 30 [1949], 
New York 2 [1947] or Bahia 148 [date unknown]). These are routinely included in 
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surveys of abstract photography, despite the fact that it is generally clear what such 
images depict. Bert Danckaert’s Horizon series (2014-6) offers a more recent example 
in a similar vein: quiet, beautifully composed, photographs focusing on junctures 
where two or more wall surfaces or finishes in the same plane abut one another or 
overlap, or a wall meets a pavement, road or grass verge at ninety degrees, but framed 
so that this is not immediately apparent (Horizon #019 (Guangzhou) [2014], Horizon 
#017 (Lodz) [2014]).  
Absent the act of framing that brings their disparate entities into dialogue, 
what such images show would remain mere details in an undefined, unbounded field. 
In the resulting images one sees planes in shallow space rather than volumetric forms, 
even if those planes consist of real objects. That one recognizes worldly objects such 
as walls and other planar surfaces photographed parallel to the picture plane, rather 
than just planes of colour, shapes or lines is what makes such images weakly abstract. 
It also shows that recognizing three-dimensional objects need not involve perception 
of volumetric form.27  
 
5. Strong Abstraction 
Like weak abstraction, strong abstraction involves straight recording of the world. 
Unlike weak abstraction, it records the world in such a way as to no longer give rise 
to an experience, even an ambiguous or liminal one, of seeing everyday objects. The 
difference between weak and strong abstraction can be as minimal as how an image is 
                                                     
27 The same is true of photograms that allow viewers to recognize everyday objects in their 
surfaces by means of their silhouettes, while eliciting perception of neither volumetric form 
nor the three-dimensional space such objects might inhabit.  
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cropped. It is possible to take a weakly abstract work and render it strongly abstract 
simply by cropping away those parts of the image, such as wall edges, that enable us 
to recognize objects in its surface. 
This will naturally give rise to the worry that weak and strong abstraction 
cannot be kept apart on principled grounds. A more pressing worry, however, may be 
that weak abstraction collapses back into proto-abstraction. For it would seem that in 
so far as one can make out either volumetric form or everyday objects in an image, it 
will count, indeterminately, as proto- and/or weakly abstract and, in so far as one 
cannot, it will count as strongly abstract. But this would be too quick: the difference 
between proto and weak abstraction is that between recognizing everyday objects 
exhibiting volumetric form and being able to make out everyday objects, such as wall 
surfaces or edges, even in the absence of such form.  
With strong abstraction it may seem that we have finally reached the terminus. 
But note that whether or not strongly abstract works count as “abstraction proper” will 
depend in part on prior methodological commitments. If one’s theory pivots on what a 
suitable viewer perceives in an image—in this case a non-volumetric formal array—
such works will count as abstraction proper. But if one’s theory pivots, not on what 
such a viewer should experience, but on whether or not an image does in fact record 
the world, even strongly abstract photographs will count as fully representational—
irrespective of whether the viewer recognizes this.  
Orthodox and New theorists are likely to differ with respect to such cases. 
Orthodox theorists will be obliged to take the latter route on pain of refusing, in the 
face of all evidence to the contrary, that strongly abstract works count as photographs 
stricto sensu. New theorists, by contrast, need not. Taking the latter route is the only 
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option open to Orthodox theorists because such images do in fact record the world, 
even if they do so in such a way that we are unable to say what they depict. Because 
New theorists are not wedded to a background theory of photography as a recording 
medium, they will feel no pressure to withhold the epithet “abstraction” from such 
cases—irrespective of whether or not they straightforwardly record the world. 
 
 
6. Constructed Abstraction  
By contrast to both weak and strong abstraction, constructed abstraction involves the 
construction of an image from scratch: no straight recording of the world, if that is 
understood to be of a prior, camera independent reality, is involved. And, by contrast 
to the constructed variant of faux abstraction, no construction of a scene is involved 
either; instead it is the image itself that is now constructed from the ground up. Such 
images nonetheless count as photographs for New theorists because they implicate a 
photographic event in their causal history. Orthodox theorists, by contrast, will have 
to refuse to so count them, given that they are neither belief-independent, nor causally 
and counterfactually dependent on some prior object or scene. Lopes calls such work 
“Lyrical Photography,” noting that it cannot be photography if Orthodoxy is true. One 
might equally call it “Material photography,” in so far as it turns its attention inwards, 
onto the material processes and procedures of photography itself. 
  Examples include works by Wolfgang Tillmans, Walead Beshty and James 
Welling, among others. Tillmans’s Freischwimmer series comprises sumptuous 
abstractions punctuated by clusters of black gestural swirls often on a scale to rival 
mid-Century gestural abstract painting. Generated from scratch in the darkroom, and 
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despite suggesting chemicals flows, these images are made through an entirely dry 
process that involves manipulating the projection of light onto sheets of light sensitive 
photographic paper with various baffles and light emitting tools, and then enlarging 
the results. Beshty’s “multiple-sided” images are made by exposing different facets of 
three-dimensional constructions made out of light sensitive photographic paper, to 
different coloured lights in total darkness. The constructions are then unfolded and the 
paper developed it in the normal way. This results in images that call to mind 
crumpled paper, but in which the paper itself seems to be rendered directly from 
coloured light.28 Though they retain some passages of volumetric form, taken as a 
whole the works seem clearly abstract. Finally, James Welling’s Fluid Dynamics 
series which, like Tillmans, is reminiscent of gestural abstraction but, unlike Tillmans, 
is made using an entirely wet process, serves to make visible a prior, semi-liquid state 
of the very surface one is looking at when one looks at the image. Made by prolonged 
soaking of chromogenic paper in water so as to mobilize the dies in the paper surface, 
the paper is removed from the water and exposed to light. This fixes an image of the 
dies’ disposition across the paper’s surface. One is seeing these flows when one looks 
at the resulting image. 
 
7. Concrete Abstraction  
What I call Constructed Abstraction may initially seem close to what the Gottfried 
Jäger calls “Concrete Photography.” On Jäger’s account, this foregrounds artefacts of 
photographic processes or events, but has no denotative content. It takes the medium, 
                                                     
28 Work titles (e.g. Six-Sided Picture (RGBCMY), January 11th 2007, Valencia, California, 
Fujicolor Crystal Archive [2007]) document the process of construction, colours projected 
(here: red, green, blue, cyan, magenta, yellow), paper used, place and date of creation. 
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processes, materials and mechanisms of photography as both the means and end. So 
understood, Concrete Photography is a late flowering of modernism in photography.29 
But not only does Concrete Photography, so understood, not exhaust the domain of 
abstract photography, it cannot be straightforwardly identified with abstraction more 
generally. Abstraction in art is typically eliminative or reductive: it removes features 
deemed inessential to something’s continued existence as an entity of a given kind. 
Piet Mondrian’s transformation from landscape painter to abstract painter through a 
process of reduction, simplification and gradual elimination of the motif is a classic 
example. Mondrian dispensed with the depiction of everyday objects and volumetric 
form, but did not thereby dispense with painting, thereby demonstrating that neither 
could be essential to painting. Concrete Art and Constructive Abstraction, by contrast, 
are typically additive: they generate an image from scratch rather than arriving at it by 
a process of elimination.  
This is one reason Constructive Abstraction cannot be identified with Strong 
Abstraction: where the former constructs an image from scratch, the latter generates 
its images by framing pre-existing scenes in such a way as to remove any depictive 
cues. But a more substantive reason is that it is in principle possible to construct an 
image from scratch in such a way as to give rise to an experience of non-veridically 
seeing volumetric form. Some of the Beshtys and Tillmans do just this. Anything that 
gives rise to an experience of non-veridically perceiving volumetric form in this way 
fails the test of strong abstraction, despite being entirely constructed. This shows that 
                                                     
29 Concrete Photography, as Jäger presents it, is the point at which Concrete Art, as defined in 
Theo van Doesburg’s “Manifesto of Concrete Art” (1930), and Abstract Photography overlap. 
See “Concrete Photography,” in Jäger (et al) Concrete Photography/Konkrete Fotografie, 
also available here: http://www.gottfried-jaeger.de/articles%23categoryArticles?id=97.   
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constructed and strong abstraction are distinct; though what is constructed is often 
also strong, it need not be.  
These points of convergence between Constructed abstraction and Concrete 
Photography should not, however, be allowed to obscure their differences. Besides 
the much less programmatic nature of Constructed abstraction, on the typology I have 
developed, there is no pressure to endorse Jäger’s normative claims for the kinds of 
photography he both practices and champions, to the effect that: i) such practices are 
the only pure form of photography (in some honorific sense of “pure”) or ii) simply in 
virtue of taking photography’s means and processes as its focus, such photography 
rules out subject matter or association. One of the goals of my typology is to show 
that what is often generically typed as “abstract photography” is a complex, multi-
faceted phenomenon that comes in many forms. Holding up any one such form as its 
telos is indefensibly reductive. And even if, contrary to fact, all works of Constructed 
Abstraction or Concrete Photography did renounce subject matter, this would still not 
suffice to show that they have no external content or referent. At the very least, such 
works index actions—indeed, often complex iterated processes—suggesting they may 
take a certain kind of performance as their subject matter. All the works by Beshty, 
Tillmans and Welling discussed thematize the labour of their own making and thereby 
comment on the, generally underplayed, labour of photography itself.  
So far as abstraction in photography goes, New Theory implies not only that it 
is possible, but that it comes in various strands or strengths that warrant the term on 
various grounds, sometimes to do with differences in how images appear, other times 
to do with how they are made. No one such strand can be non-normatively privileged, 
and critical or participant preferences make a poor foundation for theory building. But 
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all such photography explores the space of photographic possibility, a space that turns 
out to be far more capacious than Orthodoxy ever imagined.30   
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